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Tests for Automobile Guest Statute Application
Ford L. Noble* and Donald L. Guarnieri**
T IS OUR PURPOSE HERE to explore the legal solution to one
element of the common law that has been abrogated by the
coming of the automobile, the right of action of one riding in a
vehicle against a negligent driver of that vehicle.
Under the common law, there was a simple answer. If a
plaintiff could prove that the defendant driver was negligent,
and that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff would be successful. But, as in
many cases where a rule of law, formulated to fit other times,
is applied to new and different fact situations and values, this
rule became much abused. The grave concern of legislatures and
courts with this turn of events was voiced thus by a California
court:
As the use of automobiles became almost universal, the pro-
verbial ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds
him, found a counterpart in the many cases that arose where
generous drivers, having offered rides to guests, later found
themselves defendants in cases that often turned on close
questions of negligence. Undoubtedly, the legislature, in
adopting (the guest statute), reflected a certain natural
feeling as to the injustice of such a situation.'
The General Problem
Several states of the United States passed guest statutes at-
tempting to solve this problem. These statutes require the in-
jured party to prove wanton or wilful misconduct on the part of
the operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of
the motor vehicle while the injured party was a guest in the
automobile, in order to recover.2
Since the guest statutes seriously limit common law rights,
the courts were early presented with the problem of their con-
stitutionality. A case in 1925 in Connecticut presented the now
usual guest statute situation. There the plaintiff found it im-
*BA., Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
** BA., Hiram College; third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841, 843 (1930).
2 In Ohio, Rev. Code, sec. 4515.02 (G. C. sec. 6308-6).
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possible to prove wilful and wanton negligence, although she
proved ordinary negligence with no difficulty. When the plain-
tiff lost the case, she appealed on the ground that the statute
denied to her due process of law. The State Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the statute. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, that court, considering the
constitutional question only, affirmed the lower court.3
Three years later, the Kentucky Supreme Court was pre-
sented with the question of the constitutionality of its own guest
statute, and disagreed with the United States Supreme Court,
at least as far as the guest statute applied to its own State Con-
stitution. Here the constitutionality of the guest statute was chal-
lenged by an executor in a wrongful death case. He contended
that, since he could not show wilful misconduct, though he could
show negligence, the fact that he could not recover for his de-
cedent's estate contravened the Constitution of the State insofar
as wrongful death actions were concerned. The court, agreeing
with the plaintiff, said, in part:
The guest statute ... undertakes to take away the right to
recover for death resulting from negligence, or wrongful act
amounting to anything less than an intentional act, and to
that extent it clearly contravenes . . .the Constitution.
4
The Kentucky view serves to point up the fact that the
courts generally have had a difficult time reconciling the various
guest statutes with traditional rules. However, under such stat-
utes, if it can be shown that the complaining party was a
passenger, and not a guest, only ordinary negligence on the
part of the operator, owner, or person responsible need be
proven.
The problem of who is a guest thus has been of importance
in all the states which have enacted such statutes. This distinc-
tion has been described in 2 Restatement of Torts 1273, section
490, thus: "The designation of 'passenger' as one carried for hire
or reward, as distinguished from 'guest' as one carried gratui-
3 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 123, 50 S. Ct. 57, 59, 74 L. Ed. 221, 226, 65
A. L. R. 939 (1929).
4 Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S. W. 2d 347, 349 (1932). Further
commenting on the fact that the plaintiff must prove wilful and wanton
misconduct the court said, "Now when (plaintiff's) right to recover is re-
stricted by such qualifications and conditions as these, we think these quali-
fications and conditions constitute, within the meaning . . .of the Consti-
tution, not only a limitation upon the amount to be recovered, but prac-
tically destroy his right to recovery."
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tously, that is, without any financial return except such slight
benefit as is customary as part of the ordinary courtesy of the
road."
However, the above formula is easier stated than applied.
The courts have developed almost as many different interpreta-
tions of the guest statutes as there are problems connected with
them.
Most courts have concluded that where a rider in an auto-
mobile has conferred a substantial benefit on the driver (and
this benefit need not necessarily be monetary) such rider is a
"passenger" and not a "guest." A good illustration was present-
ed by a recent Oregon case. There the defendant, a real estate
salesman, was transporting the plaintiff and her parents, in the
defendant salesman's automobile, to inspect some real property
which the parents were considering purchasing. Plaintiff was
injured by the defendant's ordinary negligence. At the trial the
plaintiff showed that defendant had knowledge of the fact that
she was going to pay part of the purchase price of the property
and that her parents were going to rely on her judgment as to
whether or not they should buy the property. The jury found
for the plaintiff, but the trial judge set aside the verdict and
directed a verdict for the defendant, on the basis of the guest
statute. In reversing, the appellate court found that the plain-
tiff had conferred a "tangible, direct and material benefit" on
the defendant, and thus was without the statute.5
This same "tangible, direct and material benefit" rule was
applied by an Iowa court. It held that the guest statute did not
apply in a case where the defendant transported the plaintiff
and his brother A to another city to view a tractor which the
defendant desired to sell to A. Plaintiff went along for the sole
purpose of advising A as to the wisdom of the purchase, and A
told the defendant that he (A) would not close the deal except
on the advice of the plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained an injury result-
ing from a faulty condition of defendant's automobile. Plaintiff
5 Luebke v. Hawthorne, 183 Ore. 362, 192 P. 2d 990, 992 (1949). Along the
same lines, the court here cited with approval Wittrock v. Newcom,
224 Iowa 925, 227 N. W. 286 (1938) which held that a woman rider
in an automobile which was being demonstrated to a customer was not a
guest where she was requested to ride because she was related to and em-
ployed by the prospective customer and the salesman thought her presence
would further his chances of making a sale. The court said this expectation
on the part of the salesman was sufficient to constitute a definite and
tangible benefit to him, the salesman.
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was found to be a passenger, and not a guest, and was required
to prove only ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant.'
Using the same reasoning outlined above, many courts have
held that where the rider shares the expenses for the trip with
the driver, the rider is a paying passenger. The classic case on
sharing of expenses is a New York Court of Appeals case decided
in 1938.7 Here a group of school teachers embarked on an auto-
mobile sight-seeing trip of the West, and the agreement was
strictly a "share-the-expenses" proposition. The defendant
driver negligently damaged the car in Montana, and plaintiff
rider was injured. In construing the Montana Guest Statute
(incidentally, New York is one of the states which does not have
a guest statute), the court held that the sharing of the expenses
took the plaintiff out of the guest statute. She obtained relief
upon her proof of ordinary negligence.
Similarly, where the plaintiff and defendant took a trip in
the defendant's automobile in order to inspect jointly owned
property, and the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's negli-
gent operation of the vehicle, the court held that, as the plain-
tiff had paid $50.00 as his share of the gas and oil expense, he
was a paying passenger and entitled to a judgment upon proof of
ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant.8 It should be
pointed out that this case was based on the view that the parties
were joint venturers.
However, this view is far from being universally adopted,
as a recent Kentucky case, also presenting a "share-the-expen-
ses" situation, illustrates.9 Here, plaintiffs, husband and wife,
made a trip with the defendant to visit A, the daughter of the
plaintiffs. Enroute, the defendant negligently damaged the car
and injured the plaintiffs. The court held that in spite of the
fact that the plaintiffs had paid their proportionate share of the
expenses, they were guests in the auto, saying:
... the sharing of the cost of gas and oil consumed on a trip,
when the trip is taken for pleasure or social purposes, does
not transform into a passenger one who without such ex-
change would be a guest.
The main problem facing the courts, however, does not con-
cern the ordinary fact situation. The difficulty usually is caused
6 Mitchell v. Heaton, 231 Iowa 269, 1 N. W. 2d 284, 138 A. L. R. 832 (1941).
7 Smith v. Clute, 277 N. Y. 407, 14 N. E. 2d 455 (1938).
8 Walker v. Adamson, 9 Cal. 2d 287, 70 P. 2d 914 (1937).
9 Ansback v. Greenberg, 256 S. W. 2d 1, 2 (Ky., 1952).
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by one of the many varieties of unusual factual conditions which
something as widely used as the automobile can present. Such
a case is illustrated by a Texas case where the plaintiff and the
defendant went on a joint pleasure trip. During the course of
the trip the plaintiff was injured due to the negligence of the
defendant. At the trial the plaintiff contended that, because he
was intoxicated at the time the trip was commenced, he was
incapable of entering into a "guest contract", and therefore was
not a guest under the statute. The trial judge held that even if
the plaintiff was intoxicated to the extent that he did not know
what he was doing when he entered the automobile, he was still
a guest since he did not pay for the ride. On appeal, the decision
was affirmed on the ground that the host-guest relation is not
necessarily created by contract.10
Another unusual fact situation faced a Connecticut court.
There the plaintiff had free passes to a motion picture and agreed
to give one to the defendant. In return, the defendant was to
transport the plaintiff and others to the theater. The plaintiff
was injured and filed suit, admitting that the defendant was
guilty at most of ordinary negligence, but contending that the
free pass which she gave the defendant made her a paying pas-
senger. In denying relief to the plaintiff, on the ground that the
situation was one of "reciprocal hospitality", the court said:
Although the operation of the statute in denying a right of
recovery should not be extended, by construction, beyond
the correction of evils and the attainment of social objects
sought by it, equally, the scope of the term "guest" should
not be so restricted as to defeat or impair those purposes,
as would be the case if one riding as a mere recipient of
hospitality be excluded from the status of guest."
A Michigan court held that a wartime "car-pool" was a
mere "exchange of amenities between host and guest." It did
not give the executor a cause of action against the driver of
the vehicle for the death of one of the riders where gross negli-
gence was not pleaded or proved.12
Still another unusual question was presented to a Massa-
10 Linn v. Nored, 133 S. W. 2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939). The court here
cited with approval Balian v. Ogassin, 277 Mass. 525, 179 N. E. 232 (1931),
which held that a motorist's gratuitous undertaking to transport another
imposes no liability for ordinary negligence even where such other person
is a child; and that the age of the child does not affect the degree of care
of the operator, although it may affect the nature of the care required.
11 Chaplowe v. Powsner, 119 Conn. 188, 179 Atl. 470, 472 (1934).
12 Everett v. Burg, 301 Mich. 734, 4 N. W. 2d 63 (1942).
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chusetts court. There the plaintiff and the defendant entered
into an agreement whereby the plaintiff allowed the defendant
free use of a garage in exchange for automobile pleasure trips
from time to time in the defendant's car. On one of these trips,
the plaintiff was injured due to a faulty condition existing in the
auto. He brought suit. At the trial, the judge directed a verdict
for the defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence. Plaintiff
appealed on the ground that the question of negligence should
have gone to the jury. The appellate court, in reversing the
lower court decision, held that the agreement between the
parties was of a sufficiently contractual nature to remove the
plaintiff from the status of guest, and that the lower court had
erred in refusing to allow the question of negligence to go to the
jury.'3
Finally, consider the recent case of the Minnesota automobile
owner who was found to be a guest in his own car.14 Plaintiff and
his wife agreed to go on an extended automobile pleasure trip
with the defendant husband and wife, all parties being domiciled
in Minnesota. It was agreed that plaintiff's car would be used
and that the two couples would share the expenses. While driv-
ing his own car, plaintiff became tired and asked the defendant
to drive. Defendant consented, and while driving the car in
South Dakota, ran off the road and severely damaged the car.
Plaintiff's wife was killed and plaintiff was injured. The trial
judge applied the South Dakota guest statute, deciding that
plaintiff and his wife were guests in their own car and, further,
that the agreement to share the expenses did not make them
passengers. On appeal, in affirming the lower court decision, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that as the guest statute is in
derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed.
Merely sharing expenses does not take a plaintiff out of the guest
status. Because the use of the plaintiff's car had no bearing on
the purpose of the trip, plaintiff and his wife were guests in their
own car and could not recover, absent proof of wilful misconduct
on the part of the defendant.
It should be pointed out that most of the courts, writing on
these statutes, begin their opinions with the thought that the
guest statutes are in derogation of the common law, and there-
fore must be construed strictly. Just how strictly is left to the
discretion of the trial courts. How substantial a benefit must be
13 Chooljian v. Nahigian, 273 Mass. 409, 173 N. E. 511 (1930).
14 Phelps v. Benson, 90 N. W. 2d 533 (Minn., 1958).
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in order to take a plaintiff out of the guest statute is often a
matter of personal opinion.
Most of the statutes are simply written and easy to apply to
cases which clearly fall under them. It is those cases which fall
into the middle ground between "passenger" and "guest," that
present the problems. Careful reading of the guest statute cases
will reveal that many courts shape their decisions to fit the facts
of the case before them, rather than on precedents in earlier
cases. The guest statutes are usually quite brief. This leaves so
much to the court's discretion that a court often finds that its
only real limitation is its own imagination.
This, it is true, is probably consonant with the intent of the
legislatures in most cases. Yet it puts a rather unnerving burden
on the attorney who attempts to determine whether or not the
set of facts with which he is presented does or does not come
under the guest statute of the particular jurisdiction.
The Ohio Statute
Section 4515.02 of the Ohio Revised Code is a standard guest
statute. The following analysis of cases decided under this
statute will serve to point up not only the attitude of the Ohio
courts on this statute, but will also present a fuller understand-
ing of the difficulty courts have experienced in absorbing the
guest statute into their jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most precise definition of who is a guest, in
Ohio, was given by the court in one of the original guest statute
cases:
Within the meaning of (the guest statute) a guest is one
who is invited, either directly or by implication, to enjoy
the hospitality of the driver of a motor vehicle, and who
accepts such hospitality and takes a ride either for his own
pleasure or on his business without making any return to
or conferring any benefit upon the driver other than the
mere pleasure of his company.' 5
As is indicated in the foregoing, one is a guest where there
is no business relationship between the rider and the driver.
However, consider the following statement from another case:
Where there is an oral agreement between the owner of an
automobile and an automobile repairman, if the former will
assist in "tearing down" the motor as preliminary to the
repair job, the latter will thereafter return the former by
automobile to his home, without any further understanding,
15 Dorn v. North Olmsted, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N. E. 2d 11, 12 (1938).
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there is no contract express or implied that such transporta-
tion is on the basis of payment to the automobile repairman
therefor.16
The point is, would this owner have considered the job with-
out the promise of a ride? And did not the circumstances
strongly indicate a business relationship between the parties,
one incidence of such relationship being the return promise of a
ride on behalf of the repairman? Certainly as much mutual
benefit was derived from that relationship as in a recent case
involving the transportation of school children to and from
school on a share-the-service plan existing between the parents.
17
Here the Ohio Supreme Court found the children to be passen-
gers.
In cases where payment of any sort is agreed upon between
the parties, which can be considered as payment for transporta-
tion, the operator, owner, or person responsible is not protected
by the guest statute. He may be sued by the passenger for
failure to exercise ordinary care.' In one case, plaintiff and
defendant, during World War II, entered into an agreement in
which the plaintiff agreed to "carry parties to and from work
regularly in his automobile in order to qualify for tires as per-
mitted under Amendment 16 of the Tire Rationing Regulations.
Each of the riders agree to pay (plaintiff) the sum of twenty
cents, for each day that they are transported by (plaintiff)."
The riders were held to be passengers. 19
Payment for transportation can be made in many ways.
Some of these are: where the automobile host has a business
interest in the time or service of the passenger; when the passen-
ger is making a trip to assist the automobile host in arriving at a
destination for the latter's benefit; where a substantial benefit
is conferred upon the host; when the host and passenger embark
16 Ames v. Siebert, 156 Ohio St. 45, 99 N. E. 2d 905 (1951).
17 Lisner v. Faust, 168 Ohio St. 346 (1958).
18 Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N. E. 2d 217 (1943). See also
Daugherty v. Hall, 70 Ohio App. 163, 45 N. E. 2d 608 (1941).
19 Miller v. Fairley, supra n. 18 at 336, as a matter of dicta stated, "the
court is of the opinion that if the trips are made by the defendants with
the plaintiff for a purely social or incidental purpose, the statute applies,
but that if they have a business aspect or provide a recognized mutual
economic benefit, the exemption otherwise granted to the plaintiff by the
statute does not apply. See Guest Statute, 82 A. L. R. 1365, and 95 A. L. R.
1180.
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on a joint enterprise in which each is equally interested; and
when the compensation is paid by a third person.
20
If there be a family relationship between the persons riding
in the automobile and the owner, operator or person responsible
for the operation of the automobile, a presumption is raised that
the relationship between the driver and the person riding with
the driver is that of a guest and not a passenger.21 However,
there might be circumstances which would indicate that a passen-
ger status does exist even though a family relationship is evi-
dent.
22
It is immaterial who pays for the transportation rendered
to the passenger. In one case members of a lodge were being
transported to and from lodge meetings in a neighboring city
by a co-member, on the assumption and expectation that he
would be paid upon presentation of a bill to the lodge. The
riders were held to be passengers and not guests within the
meaning of the statute.
23
Also, a person riding in an automobile driven by an em-
ployee in violation of express orders given by the owner-
employer to the driver against using the car for the transporta-
tion of others, is a guest and not a passenger, and cannot recover
damages from the employer for injuries sustained. 24
Even politics have gotten into the act. In one case a candi-
date for public office drove one of his followers to a political
meeting. The purpose of the trip was to confer a benefit upon
the driver by reason of the attendance of the adherent at the
meeting. Yet the court decided that the guest statute did not
apply.25 The same was true of a sister riding with her brother,
where she was riding under an agreement whereby she and her
brother were to visit their father, she to furnish the gasoline
and oil and the brother the automobile. 26
20 Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N. E. 2d 140 (1942). The
case involved an East Liverpool couple and friends who planned a birthday
party in Steubenvile. The guests agreed to share the expenses of gas and
oil consumed on the motor trip. The court held that the sharing of the cost
of a trip for mutual pleasure or social purposes, without any business
aspect, does not change a guest into a paying passenger.
21 Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N. E. 2d 87 (1949).
22 6 Ohio Jur. 2d. Sec. 222 (1954).
23 Sprenger v. Braker, 71 Ohio App. 349, 49 N. E. 2d 958 (1942).
24 Siemers v. Vindicator Printing Co., 66 Ohio App. 246, 32 N. E. 2d 969
(1941).
25 Delk v. Young, 33 Ohio L. A. 508, 35 N. E. 2d 969 (1941).
26 Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio App. 276, 3 N. E. 2d 702 (1935).
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As indicated earlier, the need for passage of money between
the driver and the passenger is not always essential in order to
remove the rider from the guest statute.27 All that is necessary
is the passenger's presence in the automobile and some service
or benefit conveyed to the owner or operator, in some business
sense, for the expense of his transportation.2
Accordingly, where a Boy Scout was injured through the
defendant's negligent operation of a motor vehicle while the boy
was engaged in collecting waste paper from premises along the
public streets and highways and transporting it to a central
point as an enterprise of the Boy Scouts, a motion for judgment
for the defendant was denied. The court held that the boy was
not a guest at the time of his injury, but a passenger.29 The
same decision was reached where the passenger was riding with
the driver in order to point out the location of a certain house,30
or the location of a stalled automobile.3 '
The Ohio courts, however, are apparently unsure as to the
degree of "benefit" the rider must confer upon the driver in
order to make the driver a passenger. In the recent carpool
case32 the Ohio Supreme Court said:
A child is a "paying passenger" and not merely a "guest"
while he is being transported from his home to his school
in an automobile driven by one of a group of parents who
have entered into a definite mutual agreement to perform
their proportionate share of the service of providing such
transportation for their children.
Here the "benefit" conferred upon the driver was that on
certain days he would not have to take his child to school, but
the child would be transported by other parents; an abstract
balance of benefit at best. However, consider the singular case
27 Hasbrook v. Wingate, supra, n. 21. The syllabus of the Hasbrook case at
p. 50 reads: "Where in the carrying of a rider, a motor vehicle's direct opera-
tion tends to promote the mutual interest of both rider and driver, thus
creating a joint business relationship between them, or where the rider ac-
companies the driver, at the instance of the latter for the purpose of having
the rider render a benefit or service to the driver on a trip which is pri-
marily for the attainment of some objective of the driver, the rider is a
'passenger."' Approved and followed in O'Rourk v. Gunsley, 154 Ohio St.
375, 96 N. E. 2d 1 (1950).
28 Hasbrook v. Wingate, supra n. 27.
29 Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N. E. 2d 105 (1952).
30 Dorn v. North Olnsted, supra n. 15.
31 Ward v. Barringer, 123 0. S. 565, 176 N. E. 217 (1931).
32 Lisner v. Faust, supra n. 17, at 346.
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decided in the Youngstown Court of Appeals in 1956. 33 Here the
defendant, a minor with only a permit to drive which stated that
he had to have a licensed driver with him at all times when driv-
ing, requested the plaintiff, a personal friend of the defendant
and a licensed driver, to take a ride in the defendant's automo-
bile, with the defendant driving, for the purpose of getting a cup
of coffee. While returning, the defendant was negligent, struck
a post off the side of the road, and the plaintiff was injured. At
the trial, plaintiff contended that he was a passenger in the ve-
hicle since the purpose of the defendant's invitation was to allow
the defendant to drive his car lawfully. The defendant argued
that the relation of the parties and the nature of the trip ren-
dered the plaintiff a guest and, since plaintiff did not plead
wilful misconduct, moved for a directed verdict. This motion
was denied, and when the jury found that the plaintiff was a
passenger, the trial judge awarded the verdict to him.
The Court of Appeals, using the kind of reasoning one must
expect to find when reading guest statute cases, reversed the
decision of the lower court. Citing Hasbrook v. Wingate (152
Ohio St. 50, 87 N. E. 2d 187), and other cases which dealt with
the type of benefit required on the part of the rider to the driver,
the court determined that because of the difficulty of classifica-
tion under the guest statute, there has developed a "twilight
zone between just who is a guest and who is a passenger," and
that rather than follow "rules" (precedent) a court must de-
cide each case on its own facts. It decided that, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's automobile.
Whether or not the Sabo case flies in the face of established
precedent is not only difficult to answer, but somewhat im-
material as well. The legislature, in wording the statute, seems
to have intended the courts to decide each case on its facts, as
the court in the Sabo case did. It is curious law that cannot be
ascertained until after a trial in each case.
Criteria Established by the Decisions
Lest the reader conclude that the guest statute is entirely
shrouded in doubt, and that the lawyer has no guide at all as to
whether or not he has a valid guest statute case, we should
point out that the Ohio courts have, at various times and places,
stated certain standards under which a guest statute case can be
decided.
33 Sabo v. Marn, 103 Ohio App. 113, 3 Ohio 2d 181 (1956).
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One rule is certain: to take a rider out of the operation of the
guest statute, it is necessary that he pay for his transportation.
This payment must be made in a business and not a social sense.
Furthermore, payment in terms of money may be dispensed with
if the driver is deriving some economic benefit (in a business
sense) from the presence of the passenger. Along the same lines,
the Ohio Supreme Court has formulated a list of criteria as to
whether or not a trip is business or social: 34 (1), the nature of
the relations between the motorist and the party transported;
(2) the nature or object of the trip; (3) the nature of the ar-
rangement as an isolated instance or containing an element of
permanency and continuity; (4) whether the arrangement is
casual or based on a definite and specific contract; (5) the nature
of the payment; and (6) whether the payment is adequate or in-
adequate for the service rendered.
The Supreme Court recently used the subjective test of mu-
tual intention as an overall test, saying:
There must be some mutual intention on the part of both
the rider in and the driver of the motor vehicle to create the
.status of "passenger" before it can come into being, and this
mutual intention must have its consummation before and not
after an accident and injury to the rider. Of course, if the
owner of a motor vehicle insists upon an arrangement by
which a person riding with him is obligated to share the ex-
pense of a trip, the provision thus made will preclude the
relationship of "host" and "guest" notwithstanding the trip
may have a social aspect.35
The same Court, in Miller v. Fairley, discussed at some length
the question of contribution of expense money by the rider, con-
cluding that:
Keeping in mind the purpose of the statute, it would seem
that any expense money paid by a person for a ride in an
automobile which is not substantially commensurate with the
cost of such transportation will not take him out of the guest
status fixed by the statute, unless payment for transportation
as such was actually agreed upon. (Italics by the court.) 36
As to the difficult question of what constitutes a business trip as
opposed to a social trip, it went on to say:
Generally, when it appears that a contract for transportation
bears one or more of the indicia of a business arrangement,
34 Miller v. Fairley, supra n. 18.
35 Hasbrook v. Wingate, supra n. 27 at 58.
36 Miller v. Fairley, supra n. 34 at 337-338.
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and especially where such arrangement is specifically for
transportation, or comprehends a trip of considerable mag-
nitude or contemplates repeated or more or less regular rides,
even though the ultimate purpose may be for pleasure, the
person paying for gasoline and oil consumed, or other auto-
mobile expenses, is held to be a passenger, not a guest.8 7
Finally, reminiscent of the California case with which we be-
gan our analysis,8 the Ohio Supreme Court has given us the
most succinct standard regarding the guest statute. It deals, as
did the California case and as does the statute itself, principally
with the underlying theory of the guest statutes:
What was intended originally as a gratuity, cannot subse-
quently be made the basis of an obligation.39
Conclusion
Automobile guest statutes, like so many other new things
that are a part of our daily life, were first approached with cau-
tion akin to apprehension, by both courts and lawyers. They were
not quickly assimilated into the law. But today most of the
ramifications of these statutes have been explored. Definite rules
and standards have begun to take definite shape. The chief tests
and criteria enunciated by the Ohio cases are generally valid
anywhere.
With the growing number of law suits by injured riders
against negligent drivers of automobiles in the United States, it
becomes increasingly clear that the guest statutes serve a valid
and useful purpose. Moreover, as case law dealing with the guest
statutes increases, it seems clear that the remaining problems
and questions now faced by courts and attorneys will be an-
swered. We soon may properly stop thinking of these statutes
as encroachments on our established rules of jurisprudence.
37 Ibid.
38 Crawford v. Foster, supra n. 1.
39 Hasbrook v. Wingate, supra n. 35 at 58.
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